Notre Dame Law School

NDLScholarship
Journal Articles

Publications

1980

Serving the Guilty
Thomas L. Shaffer
Notre Dame Law School, thomas.l.shaffer.1@nd.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession
Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas L. Shaffer, Serving the Guilty, 26 Loy. L. Rev. 71 (1980).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/177

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please
contact lawdr@nd.edu.

SERVING THE GUILTY*
Thomas L. Shaffert
My purpose here is to ask whether there is a moral way for a
lawyer to serve the guilty. I think this is an issue Mr. Rightor
would have enjoyed. He was devoted to the instruction of future
lawyers, particularly those who studied law at this law school and
were enrolled in his classes in professional ethics. He was equally
devoted, in the midst of a busy and successful law practice, to care
and compassion for the occasional professional colleague who had,
as Mr. McDonald said in his eulogy, "through ignorance or . . .
financial plight. . . allowed his feet to stumble." Mr. Rightor was
devoted as well to the victims of lawyers and of the society that
lawyers create.
The Issue
How to serve the guilty is probably the oldest and most persistent of moral questions for trial lawyers. Its age and persistence
are evidenced by the vehemence with which non-lawyers condemn
us for serving the guilty, and by the energy and sophistry the organized profession gives to defending trial lawyers.
I pose the question here in terms of a quaint treatment of
it-the character of Thomas Furnival, barrister and member of
Parliament, in Anthony Trollope's novel Orley Farm.' Trollope's
reaction to Furnival is in many ways the reaction our youngest students have to us lawyers when they first come to law school and
ask us whether it is possible to represent guilty clients. Furnival's
reaction to himself is like the reaction law professors have to that
question.
* This paper is the text of the Inaugural Rightor Lecture given in memory of
Edward R. Rightor (1896-1962), a member of the Louisiana Bar and an instructor
in Professional Ethics at Loyola University School of Law. It represents the first

in a series of annual lectures to be sponsored by this law school's St. Thomas
More Club. The purpose of these lectures will be to focus on various ethical
considerations that an attorney must face in the practice of law.
t Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. A. TROLLOPE, ORLEY FARM (A. A. Knopf, New York 1950).
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Orley Farm is the story of a guilty woman, Lady Mary Mason,
who has forged what appears to be a codicil to the will of her dying
husband, Sir Joseph Mason. She has done this 20 years before the
novel begins. The codicil has been proved in litigation through
Lady Mason's testimony; her son Lucius is now in possession of
Orley Farm. Sir Joseph's eldest son, Joseph Mason, has been
cheated out of the farm. He is a child of Sir Joseph by a former
marriage; Lucius is Lady Mason's only child. Her forgery is like
the misdeed of the biblical Rebecca; she has acted dishonestly to
benefit her child.
A scheming and vengeful solicitor named Dockwrath has as he
believes been mistreated by Lucius and he sets out to prove the
forgery from old documents which will show how Lady Mason
managed to get through the will contest. What she did was this: On
the day the codicil was supposedly executed the witnesses to it
signed another document for Sir Joseph-a partnership deed.
Lady Mason gave the codicil that same date; the witnesses to the
deed thought (and testified) that what they signed was the codicil.
Dockwrath produces the partnership deed and the aging witnesses,
and the witnesses are prepared to say that they signed only one
paper. He then succeeds in getting Joseph Mason and his respectable London lawyers to agree to prosecute Lady Mason for perjury,
based on her testimony in the will contest. That is the tension of
the story. Trollope thought it was his best plot in some 47 novels.
Lady Mason returns to the barrister who represented her in
the will contest-Thomas Furnival. Furnival represents and befriends her even though he comes quickly to see what happened
and to believe that his client is guilty of forgery and perjury. He
serves the guilty with misgiving and professional bluster, as we justify to our students the fact that we and our colleagues serve the
guilty. I want to pause, now, for a while, over these loyalties and
emotions of Thomas Furnival.
Lady Mason is an attractive client-pretty, upright, dependent, pathetic but appealing in her pathos. That is part of it. Another part is that Furnival has been through this issue once before
and then managed to suppress his doubts about her and get her a
verdict, a result which convinces Furnival himself that he was right
to suppress his doubts:
"Twenty years ago, at the time of the trial, he had at one time
thought,-it hardly matters to tell what, but those thoughts had not
been favourable to her cause. Then his mind had altered, and he
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had learned,-as lawyers do learn-to believe in his own case. And
when the day of triumph had come, he had triumphed loudly, commiserating his dear friend for the unjust suffering to which she had
been subjected ...
But the first stages of dealing with Lady Mason on the second
occasion raise the old doubts-and, because Furnival is sharp, he
can see what happened. Nonetheless:
Mr. Furnival did think that he might induce a jury to acquit
her; but he terribly feared that he might not be able to induce the
world to acquit her also. As he thought of all the case, he seemed to
put himself apart from the world at large. He did not question himself as to his own belief, but seemed to feel that it would suffice for
him if he could so bring it about that her other friends should think
her innocent. It would by no means suffice for him to secure for her
son the property, and for her a simple acquittal. It was not that he
dreaded the idea of thinking her guilty himself; perhaps he did so
think her now-he half thought her so, at any rate; but he greatly
dreaded the idea of others thinking her so.
So there were three things working on Mr. Funival-personal
attraction, what he thought of as loyalty, and a zeal born of professionalism. In all of these ways and in each of them a lawyer comes
to believe in his own case. Trollope makes an interesting
distinction!
Furnival is attracted to Lady Mason; he feels a loyalty to her
which is more than professional loyalty: He wants to save her from
the world's disapproval-which means that Furnival knows that
the world cannot forgive her as he does. "He wished he could know
whether or no she were innocent, without knowing whether or no
she were guilty." In fact,
He said to himself that he could forgive the fault. That it had
been repented ere this he did not doubt, and it would be sweet to
say to her that it was very grievous, but that yet it might be forgiven. It would be sweet to feel that she was in his hands, and that
he would treat her with mercy and kindness. But then a hundred
other thoughts forbade him to think more of this. If she had been
guilty-if she declared her guilt to him-would not restitution be
necessary? In that case her son must know it, and all the world must
know it. Such a confession would be incompatible with that innocence before the world which it was necessary that she should maintain. Moreover, he must be able to proclaim aloud his belief in her
innocence; and how could he do that, knowing her to be
guilty-knowing that she also knew that he had such knowledge? It
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was impossible that he should ask any such question, or admit of
any such confidence.
Mr. Furnival cannot face up to the consequences of Lady Mason's guilt-neither the consequences to her, nor the consequences
to himself. If she is guilty, and if he remains by her side, then he is
guilty too. It is necessary to his survival that she remain, as we
lawyers say, not guilty. She need not be innocent, but she must be
not guilty.
The importance of Lady Mason's being not guilty becomes
more prominent as the trial approaches. Mr. Furnival's ardor cools.
It bothers him that the nature of the case requires him to engage
two criminal trial lawyers whom he secretly regards as not respectable. At the trial, it is neither ardor nor his client's respectability
which pulls him through, but professionalism. In other words, it is
not her being innocent which pulls him through; it is her being not
guilty:
* * * On these three days-seeing that he had not shaken the
matter off, he rose to his work as though he still loved her, as though
all his mind was still intent on preserving that ill-gotten inheritance
for her son. It may almost be doubted whether at moments during
these three days he did not again persuade himself that she was an
injured woman.
But:
as he sat down he knew that she had been guilty! To his ear
her guilt had never been confessed; but yet he knew that it was so,
and, knowing that, he had been able to speak as though her innocence were a thing of course. That those witnesses had spoken truth
he also knew, and yet he had been able to hold them up to the execration of all around them as though they had committed the worst
of crimes from the foulest of motives! And more than this, stranger
than this, worse than this,-when the legal world knew-as the legal
world soon did know-that all this had been so, the legal world
found no fault with Mr. Furnival, conceiving that he had done his
duty by his client in a manner becoming an English barrister and an
English gentleman.
That is all possible, we lawyers say, because Lady Mason, although
not innocent, was entitled to a lawyer who would treat her as not
guilty.

Trollope editorializes in that fashion, but, great novelist that
he is, he makes his point better by comparing Furnival with other
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lawyers in the story-particularly with his junior colleague Felix
Graham, and with Mr. Chaffanbrass, a wily criminal defense lawyer, brought down from the old Bailey, whom Trollope regards as
typical.
Graham is unable to be in the case, he says, unless he believes
Lady Mason to be innocent. He disapproves of the way English
lawyers face questions of guilt and innocence. He believes that a
trial lawyer should seek to find and demonstrate truth, and not to
serve guilty clients. Furnival has to pretend to Graham that he,
Furnival, believes in Lady Mason's innocence. Chaffanbrass has
contempt for Graham. Trollope uses Graham and Chaffanbrass to
frame Furnival's moral problem. When Furnival first suggests to
Chaffanbrass that they retain Graham as their junior helper:
"'Felix Graham is very much interested in the case,' said Mr.
Furnival, 'and is as firmly convinced of her innocence as-as I am.'
And he managed to look his ally in the face and to keep his
countenance firmly.
"Ah,' said Mr. Chaffanbrass. 'But what if he should happen to
change his opinion about his own client?'
'We could prevent that, I think.'
'I'm not so sure. And then he'd throw her over as sure as your
name's Furnival.'
'I hardly think he'd do that.'
'I believe he'd do anything.' And Mr. Chaffanbrass was quite
moved to enthusiasm. "I've heard that man talk more nonsense
about the profession in one hour, than I ever heard before since I
first put a cotton gown on my back. He does not understand the
nature of the duty which a professional man owes to his client.'"
Graham is diffident in the trial, of course; Chaffanbrass growls
at him; and Trollope says that he can understand why Chaffanbrass would feel as he does:
Considering the lights with which he had been lightened, there
was a species of honesty about Mr. Chaffanbrass which certainly deserved praise. He was always true to the man whose money he had
taken, and gave to his customer, with all the power at his command,
that assistance which he had professed to sell. But we may give the
same praise to the hired bravo who goes through with truth and
courage the task which he has undertaken. I knew an assassin in
Ireland who professed that during twelve years of practice in Tip-
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perary he had never failed when he had once engaged himself. For
truth and honesty to their customers-which are great virtues-I
would bracket that man and Mr. Chaffanbrass together.
Neither Chaffanbrass nor Graham struggles with the moral
problem. Graham, like some of our youngest students, would establish a system in which accused people have no defense if lawyers think them guilty-a system in which lawyers, not juries and
judges, decide questions of guilt. Graham would deprive us of our
right to regard our clients as not guilty. Because Graham is selfrighteous in his adherence to the principle, he has to be duped by
his colleagues and he has to avoid personal contact with his client.
The world has to hide itself and to pretend, for his benefit.
Mr. Chaffanbrass does not believe that guilt has anything to
do with the case. He supposes his clients to be guilty even when
they are innocent (as in his defense of Phineas Finn, in Phineas
Redux). He is the sort of lawyer our youngest students disapprove
of; he seems to have no morals at all. He acts as if lawyers have a
license to ignore both the truth and the consequences of what they
do.
Mr. Furnival is neither a hired bravo nor a Pharisee. He gets
no comfort from sitting in judgment, and no comfort from refusing
to sit in judgment. Furnival struggles. In the end he resolves his
struggle through self-delusion. When erotic attraction has cooled,
and when there is no joy left in loyalty to his client, he comes to
believe in his case because he sees advocacy as a job. If it is service,
it is not service to his client, but service to the government.
There are two moral questions here: One is that Lady Mason
has cheated her step-son, and continues to do so. The other has to
do with a social fact: The guilty are repulsive. Lady Mason, as
pretty and respectable as she is, comes to be repulsive to everyone
in the story, even to herself. Her neighbor and friend, Sir Peregrine
Orme, loves her and is at one point engaged to marry her, but he
gives her up when he learns of her guilt. He withdraws his household from her, and becomes a dying recluse because the tragedy of
her guilt is his tragedy, too-a tragedy he cannot bear with her but
must bear alone. Lady Mason's closest friend, Sir Peregrine's
daughter-in-law, Mrs. Orme, still comforts her, but Mrs. Orme also
urges Lady Mason to confess her guilt and make restitution. Lucius, Lady Mason's son and beneficiary of her treachery, says at
the end, "She can never be my mother again." And Lady Mason
herself, although she is acquitted, admits her guilt, restores the
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farm to Joseph, and banishes herself to Germany. "She bowed her
head and kissed the rod, she prayed that her release might come to
her soon."
Revulsion and the New Testament
The social and personal reality I am concerned about is revulsion. The New Testament is filled with repulsive people; one of the
most prominent things the New Testament does is provide an answer to the issue of revulsion. But the New Testament answer is a
difficult answer. The problem of whether to serve the guilty is answered with stories of Jesus having lunch with tax collectors, and
choosing his friends from among prostitutes, thieves, violent revolutionaries, and Samaritans. "Many bad characters," St. Matthew
says (Matthew 9:10). Evidence that the New Testament answer is
difficult is available in the fact that few Christians follow Jesus'
example in this respect, and almost as few can understand it. It
may be that the processes by which the world condemns people are
important and useful processes. It may be, as is often the case with
New Testament answers, that Jesus' solution is painful.
Emile Durkheim noticed, nearly a hundred years ago, that
crime is "an integral part of all healthy societies." It is, he said, "a
movement of the public temper" more than it is an assault on the
community. It is a process for clarifying values more than it is a
challenge to values. It is both the stimulus and the product of a
society's need to stand for something. If we didn't have criminals
we would have to invent them; without criminals we would have no
public morals. Seen in this sociological perspective, Lady Mason,
in her crime, contributed to the maintenance of the private-property economy of Victorian England and to the tradition which provided for the families of dead men by having their property devolve on their eldest son.
Kai Erikson compared Durkheim's theory of deviance with the
criminal-court records of the Massachusetts Bay Colony.2 He discovered that the earliest definitional American society defended
and defined itself through three "crime waves," each of which occurred when it had a need to draw itself together, and each of
which served to locate and underline important moral values. The
2.

K. ERIKSON, WAYWARD PURITANS:

(Wiley Pub. Co. New York 1966).

A

STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE
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first of these crime waves was the antinomian controversy of the
1650's; the second was the immigration of the Quakers about five
years later; the third was the witch trials at the end of the 17th
century. Erikson notices several things about these processes of
definition which are important in understanding why it is that
New Testament stories on serving the guilty provide a painful
answer:
-Deviance is conferred. It is not accurate to define crime as
you would define a disease-as if society were a body and misconduct were pathological. Ann Hutchinson and others who were identified as deviant in the antinomian crisis were not markedly unusual in their behavior, but their behavior came at a time when it
was important to support the authority of the leaders of the colony. The Quakers were, in their theology and their political objectives, similar to the Puritans, but they came to the colony at a time
when its theocratic principles were at risk. In each case, and in the
case of the witches, who arose when expansion of the colony was
threatening its political integrity, the deviants gave the colony a
needed opportunity to reinforce values which were central to its
survival.
-This is not a game, as some deviance processes are. We have
ways of establishing good manners and civility without condemning people, but the criminal law is not one of them. Criminal law is
played out on the borders of the community; it is a confrontation
between those who act at the limits and those "whose special business it is to guard the cultural integrity of the community." This
was, given the importance of real property and of inheritance in
the island economy of England in 1860, equally true of Lady Mason and of what she was accused of doing. She forged the will, and
then lied about it, because she thought it was wrong of her husband to give nothing to her child. She knew, too, that she had confronted one wrong by committing another.
-The deviant and those who seek to punish her are cooperators. The criminal cooperates in the process by condemning himself; each side nourishes the other. There is something to be said
for Felix Graham's concern for honesty and decency in his society.
And there is something to be said for Lady Mason's role in helping
Felix get his values straight. The deviant "is not a bit of debris
spun out by faulty social machinery, but a relevant figure in the
community's overall division of labor."
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-Deviants are sometimes evil and sometimes not. The powers
of the world condemn the deviant out of their own needs, so that,
during the fervor of war, the conscientious objector is as much an
outcast as the thief. And if, occasionally, the outcast becomes a
successful revolutionary or reformer, the prosecutors of yesterday
become the outcasts of today. The important point about the sociological analysis is that power, serving as always to perpetuate itself by processes of fear, causes the deviant, the outcast, to become
repulsive.
-The community, which always has and always needs
processes of condemnation, seems to lack processes of reconciliation. It always manages to throw people out-it always has to do
that-but it lacks ways to get them back in again. Mrs. Orme, who
was Lady Mason's comforter, knew that; that is why she is a model
of virtue in her care for Lady Mason. But she is also the person
who insists on repentance, and the person who knows that, repentant or not, Lady Mason cannot get back in. Mr. Furnival sees that
fact, too, and determines to save Lady Mason from public suspicion of guilt. Sir Peregrine, who loves Lady Mason, sees the same
fact and his knowledge throws him into despair. (Sir Peregrine is
the father of Mrs. Orme's late husband. He is Lady Mason's neighbor, and until he learns she is guilty, her fiance.) The price of being
a deviant, of cooperating in the society's important task of defining
itself, is a tragic price; the stories of Jesus, while they may say
something to those of us who propose to serve the guilty, do not
make them any less guilty. Sometimes there is nothing for God to
forgive (Ann Hutchinson, or the biblical leper), and sometimes the
outcast has done something sinful (Lady Mason, the good thief),
but even if God forgives them, or doesn't need to, and we are supposed to forgive them, or don't need to, the world is not likely to
forgive them. Repentance is not a way back in; repentance is
tragic.
The point of Mr. Furnival's concern to vindicate Lady Mason
publicly, as well as judicially, is just this point. If she is condemned
publicly, her respectability is finished. When Mrs. Orme insists
that Lady Mason must admit her guilt, Mrs. Orme knows, and
Lady Mason knows, that the results of repentence will be tragic.
Lady Mason will lose her respectability, once and for all, just as
Lucius will lose Orley Farm. Repentence is not a way back into the
community. Mrs. Orme practices what Aquinas called "fraternal
correction"-the virtue of charity. She is a good friend, in all
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senses of the word; she is unconditionally caring. But she does not
hide the truth, not from herself, and not from Lady Mason. "Love
does not keep a record of wrongs; love is not happy with evil, but is
happy with the truth" (I. Cor. 13:6). Mrs. Orme knows and says
that Lady Mason cannot get back in.
Jesus forgave the woman taken in adultery, and saved her
from capital punishment. He sent her away shriven and redeemed,
but she was no less an adulteress (John 8:1-11). The social effects
of repentence, in other words, are not redemptive; God's Kingdom
is not of this world.
This is the contrast between two kingdoms. The powers of this
world turn people out-communities turn people out-and they do
it inevitably. They do it in the process of defining and defending
themselves; turning people out is part of the definition of a community which is formed by the powers of this world. Jesus' answer
to that fact is to say that his Kingdom is not part of the community formed by the powers of this world; the world of power
through fear is not part of his Kingdom. His alternative is stark
and tragic: He gathers his followers around him, but he does the
gathering on Calvary. His Kingdom, as Professor John Howard
Yoder puts it, is the Cross.8
Jesus does not re-integrate social outcasts. Mrs. Orme knew
that, and Lady Mason knew that. He redeems outcasts. The tax
gatherer who became St. Matthew was not turned into a respectable Jewish citizen; neither was Cornelius, the Roman officer to
whom the Lord sent St. Peter (Acts 10); neither was the woman
taken in adultery. When Jesus touches the leper, Jesus became a
leper. Jesus was then forbidden to enter the city openly. He was
required, like the leper, to live outside, and to call out "unclean,
unclean" (Leviticus 13:45-46; Mark 1:42-45).
The stories of Jesus and the guilty people of his day offer an
answer to this question of how a lawyer is to serve the guilty, but it
is a hard, hard, answer. Jesus offers comfort, but his is the comfort
of one who is, as Karl Barth puts it, wholly other.4 It is the comfort
3. J. YODER, THE POLITICS OF JESUS (William B. Eerdmans Grand Rapids,
Michigan 1972).
4. K. BARTH, THE EPISTLE OF THE ROMANS (6th ed. E. 0. Hoskyns trans.

Oxford University Press London 1968). See also E.

BUSCH, KARL BARTH: His LIFE
FROM LETTERS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL TEXTS (John Bowden trans. Fortress Press

Philadelphia 1976).
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of a Kingdom which is wholly other. The comfort is the comfort of
the Cross and Resurrection. It involves, for a Christian lawyer, the
agony of living, working, and wielding power in the wordly kingdom and seeking at the same time to stand with the outcasts under
the Cross.
Lawyers' Answers
None of Trollope's three lawyers meets the problem of serving
the guilty with a New Testament answer. Mr. Chaffanbrass claims
for himself the benefits of the adversary ethic. He takes advantage
of a license, which no other citizen enjoys, to overlook the consequences of what he does. Those who argue for such a license claim
that it is essential to the purposes of the government that lawyers
be given this special license: The government will do justice only if
every person called to book before the government has an advocate. Mr. Chaffanbrass would say that Lady Mason must have her
case argued fully, so that judge and jury can do justice, and that it
is the mission of other lawyers to argue the case for the prosecution. Neither set of lawyers need worry about the outcome; that is
the government's worry. Mr. Chaffanbrass's moral claim is the one
Trollope, who was a man of the world and the son of a trial lawyer,
could not upderstand; but it is the dominant principle in our Code
of Professional Responsibility, and, for the most part, the answer
we law professors give to our youngest students when they wonder
how lawyers can serve the guilty.
Felix Graham does not stand on Calvary either. He argues, as
modern "public interest" lawyers often argue, that lawyers should
see to the benefit of the community. It is more important, in Graham's view, for Lady Mason's lawyer to get at and proclaim the
truth, than it is for him to argue for Lady Mason's acquittal. The
reason it is more important to find and proclaim the truth is that a
lawyer is a public servant. "It all resolves itself into this," Graham
says,
Let every lawyer go into court with a mind resolved to make conspicuous to the light of day that which seems to him to be the truth.
A lawyer who does not do that-who does the reverse of that, has in
my mind undertaken work which is unfit for a gentleman and impossible for an honest man.
But, Trollope says, "No living orator would convince a grocer that
coffee should be sold without chicory; and no amount of eloquence
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will make an English lawyer think that loyalty to truth should
come before loyalty to his client." And, therefore, Graham is not
professionally successful. Mr. Chaffanbrass, who is successful, condemns Graham as unprofessional. Furnival, who is both respectable and successful does not trust Graham. He has to lie to Graham,
and to protect him from the lies of others.
Thomas Furnival feels a little of the agony of trying to serve
the kingdom of the world and also stand on Calvary, or at least he
feels agony which is like that agony. He resolves his agony illegitimately, though. At first, he does so through the memory of a past
triumph and an erotic attraction to his client, and then through
the familiar juices of competition. Furnival, finally, longed to beat
Sir Joseph Mason a second time, and he did; the excitement of the
courtroom carried him through. His client was an incidental professional necessity. He resolved the agony as trial lawyers, I think,
often do-through the emotional dynamics of a demanding, intricate game-a game which, I will say for myself, I find more engrossing than any other game I have ever played.
None of these lawyers has an answer which will stand up to
moral analysis. Mr. Chaffanbrass takes advantage of a license to be
immoral. He doesn't bother to argue why he should have such a
license; those who do argue say that the professional fprivilege is
necessary in order for a lawyer to serve the state. A modern American lawyer might even say that he does not serve the guilty at all;
he serves the Constitution. The problem with that as a moral position is that it includes no way to decide if the system is worth
serving. Service to power can end one up in Buchenwald-not as a
victim but as an executioner.
Felix Graham claims a dispensation from Mr. Chaffanbrass's
loyalty to Lady Mason, but his claim is essentially the same claim
Mr. Chaffanbrass makes. Graham also rests his morality on duty to
the state. He seeks to serve the public interest in much the same
way an elected official, or a civil servant, seeks to serve the public
interest. His system does not offer, any more than that of Mr.
Chaffanbrass, a way to evaluate what the state is up to.
And Furnival-poor Thomas Furnival-suffers from his passions. (That is how one refers, in the Thomistic tradition, to being
subject to lust, jealousy, anger, and pride; it is suffering from one's
passions.) He makes no clear moral claim at all, and, because he
does not, all of his decisions are made for him. He stands firmly in

19801

Serving the Guilty

mid-air. Many lawyers work outthe problem of serving the guilty
in this way. The ambivalence of it is expressed in our official rules
on serving the guilty. ("Ambivalence" is a word derived from
chemistry, which means being pulled simultaneously in two directions.) On the one hand, "It is ethical for a member of the bar to
represent the accused even if he knows the latter to be guilty. In
fact, it may be on occasion an ethical duty to do so." But, on the
other hand,
There are certain inherent limitations .... There must be no relationship between them except purely that of attorney and client;
counsel must retain control of the presentation of the case, and
neither the client nor any outside person may dictate to him how to
conduct the case .... Counsel is not expected to stultify himself in
an attempt to advance his client's interest. The attorney is justified
in withdrawing, where, during the progress of the litigation, the client engages in conduct that tends to degrade or humiliate the
attorney.
This is what you sound like when you rationalize your service in
the courts of the wordly kingdom and still try to stand on Calvary.
In the courts of the worldly kingdom, respectability-honor, if you
like-is of first importance. Our Code of Professional Responsibility often sounds as if our highest duty is to preserve the integrity
of the legal profession. But, on Calvary, we are in the service of
adulteresses, lepers, prostitutes, thieves, Samaritans, tax gatherers,
publicans, and heathens-and we are so much in their service that
we risk being regarded by the world as they are regarded. That is
the Christian life, and there is no honor in it.
Two Tentative Thoughts on a Theology of Serving the Guilty
An adequate moral answer to the problem of serving the guilty
would, I think, involve first a turning toward the guilty.
It would involve a more generous response than our official
rules allow for; it would involve even a loving relationship, an IThou relationship, as Martin Buber put it.' The Gospel seems to
say that we have to do that; we are commanded to do it. The
Christian system for approaching outcasts is manifestly a system
for, above all, being with them.
5. MARTIN
York 1970).

BUBER, I AND THOU

(notes by Walter Kaufmann, Scribner New
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My second tentative thought is that we should be honest
about looking for the face or force which makes it hard for us to
serve the guilty. The criminal law is, at least in large part, a system
for adding coercion to an agreed-upon set of moral rules. It is in
some ways a system of sin but it is not a system of redemption,
because, as Kai Erikson demonstrates, it offers no way back in. It
is, in that sense, not a moral system so much as it is a system for
protecting power. Erikson's most remarkable finding in the criminal-court records in colonial Massachusetts was that crime rates
were stable. When the fervor broke out, and people were prosecuted for disobedience, or for Quaker theology, or for black magic,
the incidence of other crimes declined. The amount of social energy given to prosecution remained stable. There seemed to be
fewer thieves, more witches, fewer murderers, more Quakers. One
offense became less important as another became more important.
The amount of energy which the worldly kingdom devoted to its
system of right and wrong was constant. That energy was always
directed to the offense which most threatened the maintenance of
power. The method and the product of that social system was fear.
You were supposed to become afraid of disobedience as you would
be of theft.
Another way to put that is that the kinds of crime which
showed up in the records were related to the things which power
feared most-disobedience as the colony began to become diverse;
unacceptable liberalism in belief as liberalism began to gain
ground in Mother England; alliances with the devil as the theocratic regime began to crumble. Evil appeared as the elders lost
authority, and as the elders lost authority evil appeared. "Men who
fear witches," Erikson says, "soon find themselves surrounded by
witches." In Lady Mason's case: "Men who become jealous of private property soon encounter eager thieves."
I am aware of a difficulty here. It is this: Is there no difference
between the guilty who are really guilty and the guilty who are
only victims of the pretensions and delusions of power and fear? Is
there no difference between Ann Hutchinson, a conscientious objector to war, or the 17th century Quaker, and a murderer, a Mafia
don, or Lady Mason? Durkheim and Erikson would say there is
none; all are cast out; none gets back in. Jesus would say there is.
"Do not suppose that I have come to abolish the Law. . . .; I did

not come to abolish, but to complete" (Matthew 5:17). He cured
the leper; he also forgave the woman taken in adultery, and saved
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the good thief (for eternity only, though, not from the cross). He
served people differently, depending on whether real guilt was present or not. But it is true-isn't it?-that he did serve them all.
The guilty were no more repulsive to him than those who were
innocent victims. It did not seem to make a difference to him
whether his client could get back in the city, as the leper did, or
not. I notice, as a tentative way to cope with the problem of real
guilt, that the law of Jesus is not like the law we serve in the courts
of the world. His is the law which finds people innocent. Not
guilty. And not "not guilty," either. But innocent:
"If splendor accompanied the dispensation under which we are condemned, how much richer in splendor must be that one under which
we are acquitted! Indeed, the splendor that once was is now no
splendor at all; it is outshone by a splendor greater still. For if that
which was soon to fade!-is soon to fade-had its moment of splendor, how much greater is the splendor of that which endures!" (II
Cor. 3:8-11)
The problem for us Christian lawyers is not: How can we serve
the guilty? It is: Why don't we serve the guilty? Why do we need
excuses such as the Constitution, or the Code of Professional Responsibility, or the integrity of the legal profession when we have
the story of Jesus? I think we fail to serve the guilty because we
are afraid. Whether the criminal law is a system of morals or not,
it is a system of fear and power. First and always it is a system
which defends itself through fear. It is not the association of people Jesus proclaimed. Stanley Hauerwas expressed, recently, what
I mean here:
[bly learning to be forgiving we are enabled to view other lives not
as threats but as gifts. Thus in contrast to all societies built on
shared resentments and fears, Christian community is formed by a
story that enables (Christians] to trust the otherness of the other as
the very sign of the forgiving character of God's Kingdom."
It is not guilt which keeps us from serving the guilty. It is fear.

6. Hauweras, Jesus: The Story of the Kingdom, 26 THEOLOGY TODAY 303,
316 (1978).

